of
this mission I have learned only from the account of it given by the Duc
de Rovigo in his apologetic Memoirs. In spite of the Duke's eagerness to
induce a belief in Napoleon's pacific disposition, the very facts on
which he supports his argument lead to the contrary conclusion. Napoleon
wished to dictate his conditions before the issue of a battle the success
of which might appear doubtful to the young Emperor of Russia, and these
conditions were such as he might impose when victory should be declared
in favour of our eagles. It must be clear to every reflecting person
that by always proposing what he knew could not be honourably acceded to,
he kept up the appearance of being a pacificator, while at the same time
he ensured to himself the pleasure of carrying on the war.

CHAPTER III.

1805.

My functions at Hamburg--The King of Sweden at Stralsund--
My bulletin describing the situation of the Russian armies--Duroc's
recall from Berlin--General Dumouriez--Recruiting of the English in
Hanover--The daughter of M. de Marbeof and Napoleon--Treachery of
the King of Naples--The Sun of Austerlitz--Prince Dolgiorouki
Rapp's account of the battle of Austerlitz--Gerard's picture--
Eugene's marriage.

I must now relate how, in conformity with my instructions, I was employed
in Hamburg in aiding the success of the French army. I had sent an agent
to observe the Russian troops, which were advancing by forced marches to
the banks of the Elbe. This agent transmitted to me from Gadbusch an
account of the routes taken by the different columns. It was then
supposed that they would march upon Holland by the way of Bremen and
Oldenburg. On the receipt of thus intelligence the Electorate of Hanover
was evacuated by the French, and General Barbou, who had commanded there
concentrated his forces in Hamelin.

On the 2d of November 1805 the King of Sweden arrived at Stralsund. I
immediately intimated to our Government that this circumstance would
probably give a new turn to the operations of the combined army, for
hitherto the uncertainty of its movements and the successive counter-
orders afforded no possibility of ascertaining any determined plan. The
intention seemed to be, that all the Swedo-Russian troops should cross
the Elbe at the same point; viz., Lauenburg, six miles from Hamburg.

There was not on the 5th of November a single Russian on the southern
bank of the Elbe.

The first column of the gra