ion of kinship persists unchanged and
invariably reasserts itself.

That is my third jackstraw. Canning spoke to Rush, Rush consulted
Monroe, Monroe consulted Jefferson, and Jefferson wrote what we have
seen. That, stripped of every encumbering circumstance, is the story of
the Monroe Doctrine. Ever since that day the Monroe Doctrine has rested
upon the broad back of the British Navy. This has been no secret to
our leading historians, our authoritative writers on diplomacy, and our
educated and thinking public men. But they have not generally been
eager to mention it; and as to our school textbooks, none that I studied
mentioned it at all.

Chapter XI: Some Family Scraps

Do not suppose because I am reminding you of these things and shall
remind you of some more, that I am trying to make you hate France. I am
only trying to persuade you to stop hating England. I wish to show you
how much reason you have not to hate her, which your school histories
pass lightly over, or pass wholly by. I want to make it plain that your
anti-English complex and your pro-French complex entice your memory into
retaining only evil about England and only good about France. That is
why I pull out from the recorded, certified, and perfectly ascertainable
past, these few large facts. They amply justify, as it seems to me, and
as I think it must seem to any reader with an open mind, what I said
about the pattern.

We must now touch upon the War of 1812. There is a political aspect of
this war which casts upon it a light not generally shed by our school
histories. Bonaparte is again the point. Nine years after our Louisiana
Purchase from him, we declared war upon England. At that moment England
was heavily absorbed in her struggle with Bonaparte. It is true that we
had a genuine grievance against her. In searching for British sailors
upon our ships, she impressed our own. This was our justification.

We made a pretty lame showing, in spite of the victories of our frigates
and sloops. Our one signal triumph on land came after the Treaty of
Peace had been signed at Ghent. During the years of war, it was lucky
for us that England had Bonaparte upon her hands. She could not give
us much attention. She was battling with the great Autocrat. We, by
declaring war upon her at such a time, played into Bonaparte's hands,
and virtually, by embarrassing England, struck a blow on the side of
autocracy and against our own political faith. It was a fee