med in music; he may be able to converse with
some correctness about classic music; he may even honestly believe that
these traits constitute his own musical standards. But if in his own
past experience, what he has been most accustomed to and has most
enjoyed is ragtime, his active or working measures of valuation are
fixed on the ragtime level. The appeal actually made to him in his own
personal realization fixes his attitude much more deeply than what he
has been taught as the proper thing to say; his habitual disposition
thus fixed forms his real "norm" of valuation in subsequent musical
experiences.
Probably few would deny this statement as to musical taste. But it
applies equally well in judgments of moral and intellectual worth. A
youth who has had repeated experience of the full meaning of the value
of kindliness toward others built into his disposition has a measure
of the worth of generous treatment of others. Without this vital
appreciation, the duty and virtue of unselfishness impressed upon him by
others as a standard remains purely a matter of symbols which he cannot
adequately translate into realities. His "knowledge" is second-handed;
it is only a knowledge that others prize unselfishness as an excellence,
and esteem him in the degree in which he exhibits it. Thus there grows
up a split between a person's professed standards and his actual ones.
A person may be aware of the results of this struggle between his
inclinations and his theoretical opinions; he suffers from the conflict
between doing what is really dear to him and what he has learned will
win the approval of others. But of the split itself he is unaware;
the result is a kind of unconscious hypocrisy, an instability of
disposition. In similar fashion, a pupil who has worked through some
confused intellectual situation and fought his way to clearing up
obscurities in a definite outcome, appreciates the value of clarity
and definition. He has a standard which can be depended upon. He may
be trained externally to go through certain motions of analysis and
division of subject matter and may acquire information about the value
of these processes as standard logical functions, but unless it somehow
comes home to him at some point as an appreciation of his own, the
significance of the logical norms--so-called--remains as much an
external piece of information as, say, the names of rivers in China. He
may be able to recite, but the recital is a mechani
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