y studies for a place in the curriculum. The solution thus far
reached consists essentially in a somewhat mechanical compromise whereby
the field is divided between studies having nature and studies having
man as their theme. The situation thus presents us with another instance
of the external adjustment of educational values, and focuses attention
upon the philosophy of the connection of nature with human affairs. In
general, it may be said that the educational division finds a reflection
in the dualistic philosophies. Mind and the world are regarded as two
independent realms of existence having certain points of contact with
each other. From this point of view it is natural that each sphere of
existence should have its own separate group of studies connected with
it; it is even natural that the growth of scientific studies should be
viewed with suspicion as marking a tendency of materialistic philosophy
to encroach upon the domain of spirit. Any theory of education which
contemplates a more unified scheme of education than now exists is under
the necessity of facing the question of the relation of man to nature.
1. The Historic Background of Humanistic Study. It is noteworthy that
classic Greek philosophy does not present the problem in its modern
form. Socrates indeed appears to have thought that science of nature was
not attainable and not very important. The chief thing to know is the
nature and end of man. Upon that knowledge hangs all that is of deep
significance--all moral and social achievement. Plato, however,
makes right knowledge of man and society depend upon knowledge of the
essential features of nature. His chief treatise, entitled the Republic,
is at once a treatise on morals, on social organization, and on the
metaphysics and science of nature. Since he accepts the Socratic
doctrine that right achievement in the former depends upon rational
knowledge, he is compelled to discuss the nature of knowledge. Since he
accepts the idea that the ultimate object of knowledge is the discovery
of the good or end of man, and is discontented with the Socratic
conviction that all we know is our own ignorance, he connects the
discussion of the good of man with consideration of the essential good
or end of nature itself. To attempt to determine the end of man apart
from a knowledge of the ruling end which gives law and unity to nature
is impossible. It is thus quite consistent with his philosophy that he
subordinates li
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