in rear and nearly parallel with the line. The gently
sloping ground was woodland on the right and open field on the left.

To strengthen the left flank, Colonel Grose's Brigade of Palmer's
division, reduced by hard fighting on the 31st to 1,000 effectives, was
ordered by General Crittenden to cross the river on the morning of the 2d
of January. These dispositions were barely completed and temporary
breastworks constructed when, at four o'clock, a magnificent sight
presented itself. General Bragg confidently expected to find the Union
Army gone from his front on the morning of the 2d of January. His cavalry
had reported the Nashville pike full of troops and wagons moving toward
Nashville. On the return of the cavalry expedition he sent Wharton to
assume command of the cavalry on the Lebanon road, consisting of his own
and Pegram's Brigade, while Wheeler, with his brigade, returned to the
vicinity of the Nashville pike to observe the movements of the Union Army
in that direction. Before Wharton had taken his position, the force east
of Stones River had attracted Bragg's attention, and reconnaissances by
staff officers revealed the line of battle formed by Beatty's division and
Grose's Brigade. From the position occupied by this force, Polk's line,
which, it will be remembered, had advanced as far as the position vacated
by Rosecrans' left on the night of the 31st, was enfiladed. Bragg says:
"The dislodgement of this force, or the withdrawal of Polk's line, was an
evident necessity. The latter involved consequences not to be entertained.
Orders were accordingly given for the concentration of the whole of
General Breckinridge's division in front of the position to be taken, the
addition to his command of ten Napoleon guns (12-pounders), under Captain
Robertson, an able and accomplished artillery officer, and for the cavalry
forces of Wharton and Pegram to join in the attack on his right." General
Breckinridge was sent for and the object of the movement explained to him.
He was ordered to drive the Union line back, crown the hill, entrench the
artillery, and hold the position. General Breckinridge was opposed to the
attack as ordered by General Bragg, and tried to dissuade him from it,
predicting disaster, as the ground occupied by the main portion of the
Union troops on the bluff on the opposite bank of the river was
considerably higher than that over which the attacking force must march,
and it was possible for Rosecrans to