n August 25, and again on
September 1. The wind on the latter day favoring movement both to go
and come, a somewhat rare circumstance, he remained all day
reconnoitring near the harbor's mouth. The British squadron appeared
complete in vessels and equipment; but Barclay had his own troubles
about crews, as had his antagonist, his continual representations to
Yeo meeting with even less attention than Perry conceived himself to
receive from Chauncey. He was determined to postpone action until
re-enforcements of seamen should arrive from the eastward, unless
failure of provisions, already staring him in the face, should force
him to battle in order to re-establish communications by the lake.
The headquarters of the United States squadron was at Put-in Bay, in
the Bass Islands, a group thirty miles southeast of Malden. The harbor
was good, and the position suitable for watching the enemy, in case he
should attempt to pass eastward down the lake, towards Long Point or
elsewhere. Hither Perry returned on September 6, after a brief visit
to Sandusky Bay, where information was received that the British
leaders had determined that the fleet must, at all hazards, restore
intercourse with Long Point. From official correspondence, afterwards
captured with Procter's baggage, it appears that the Amherstburg and
Malden district was now entirely dependent for flour upon Long Point,
access to which had been effectually destroyed by the presence of the
American squadron. Even cattle, though somewhat more plentiful, could
no longer be obtained in the neighborhood in sufficient numbers, owing
to the wasteful way in which the Indians had killed where they wanted.
They could not be restrained without alienating them, or, worse,
provoking them to outrage. Including warriors and their families,
fourteen thousand were now consuming provisions. In the condition of
the roads, only water transport could meet the requirements; and that
not by an occasional schooner running blockade, but by the free
transit of supplies conferred by naval control. To the decision to
fight may have been contributed also a letter from Prevost, who had
been drawn down from Kingston to St. David's, on the Niagara frontier,
by his anxiety about the general situation, particularly aroused by
Procter's repulse from Fort Stephenson. Alluding to the capture of
Chauncey's two schooners on August 10, he wrote Procter on the 22d,
"Yeo's experience should convince Barclay that h
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