so the same period to get ready its land forces; while incompetent
Secretaries of War and of the Navy gave place in January to capable
men in both situations.

With all this in its favor, and despite certain gratifying successes,
the general outcome was a complete failure, the full measure of which
could be realized only when the downfall of Napoleon revealed what
disaster may result from neglect to seize opportunity while it exists.
The tide then ebbed, and never again flowed. For this many causes may
be alleged. The imbecile ideas concerning military and naval
preparation which had prevailed since the opening of the century
doubtless counted for much. The intrusting of chief command to
broken-down men like Dearborn and Wilkinson was enough to ruin the
best conceived schemes. But, despite these very serious drawbacks, the
strategic misdirection of effort was the most fatal cause of failure.

There is a simple but very fruitful remark of a Swiss military writer,
that every military line may be conceived as having three parts, the
middle and the two ends, or flanks. As sound principle requires that
military effort should not be distributed along the whole of an
enemy's position,--unless in the unusual case of overwhelming
superiority,--but that distinctly superior numbers should be
concentrated upon a limited portion of it, this idea of a threefold
division aids materially in considering any given situation. One
third, or two thirds, of an enemy's line may be assailed, but very
seldom the whole; and everything may depend upon the choice made for
attack. Now the British frontier, which the United States was to
assail, extended from Montreal on the east to Detroit on the west. Its
three parts were: Montreal and the St. Lawrence on the east, or left
flank; Ontario in the middle, centring at Kingston; and Erie on the
right; the strength of the British position in the last named section
being at Detroit and Malden, because they commanded the straits upon,
which the Indian tribes depended for access to the east. Over against
the British positions named lay those of the United States. Given in
the same order, these were: Lake Champlain, and the shores of Ontario
and of Erie, centring respectively in the naval stations at Sackett's
Harbor and Presqu' Isle.

Accepting these definitions, which are too obvious to admit of
dispute, what considerations should have dictated to the United States
the direction of attack; the one, or