force, supported by the arguments of the naval officer
favoring the diversion of effort from Kingston to Toronto. Whether
Chauncey ever formally admitted to himself this fundamental mistake,
which wrecked the summer's work upon Lake Ontario, does not appear;
but that he had learned from experience is shown by a letter to the
Secretary of the Navy,[127] when the squadrons had been laid up. In
this he recognized the uselessness of the heavy sailing schooners when
once a cruising force of ships for war had been created, thereby
condemning much of his individual management of the campaign; and he
added: "If it is determined to prosecute the war offensively, and
secure our conquests in Upper Canada, Kingston ought unquestionably to
be the first object of attack, and that so early in the spring as to
prevent the enemy from using the whole of the naval force that he is
preparing."

In the three chapters which here end, the Ontario operations have been
narrated consecutively and at length, without interruption by other
issues,--except the immediately related Lake Erie campaign,--because
upon them turned, and upon them by the dispositions of the Government
this year were wrecked the fortunes of the war. The year 1813, from
the opening of the spring to the closing in of winter, was for several
reasons the period when conditions were most propitious to the
American cause. In 1812 war was not begun until June, and then with
little antecedent preparation; and it was waged halfheartedly, both
governments desiring to nip hostilities. In 1814, on the other hand,
when the season opened, Napoleon had fallen, and the United States no
longer had an informal ally to divert the efforts of Great Britain.
But in the intervening year, 1813, although the pressure upon the
seaboard, the defensive frontier, was undoubtedly greater than before,
and much vexation and harassment was inflicted, no serious injury was
done beyond the suppression of commerce, inevitable in any event. In
the north, on the lakes frontier, the offensive and the initiative
continued in the hands of the United States. No substantial
re-enforcements reached Canada until long after the ice broke up, and
then in insufficient numbers. British naval preparations had been on
an inadequate scale, receiving no proper professional supervision. The
American Government, on the contrary, had had the whole winter to
prepare, and the services of a very competent naval organizer. It had
al