proper object of chastisement. A madman, for example,
can no more properly be said to be guilty of murder than the
sword with which he commits it, both being equally incapable of
intending injury. In the present case, in like manner, although
it ought no doubt to be matter of deep sorrow and contrition to
the panel that his folly should have occasioned the loss of life
to a fellow-creature; yet as that folly can neither be {p.213}
termed malice, nor yet doth amount to a gross negligence, he
ought rather to be pitied than condemned. The fact done can never
be recalled, and it rests with your Lordships to consider the
case of this unfortunate young man, who has served his country in
an humble though useful station,--deserved such a character as is
given him in the letter of his officers,--and been disabled in
that service. You will best judge how (considering he has
suffered a confinement of six months) he can in humanity be the
object of further or severer punishment, for a deed of which his
mind at least, if not his hand, is guiltless. When a case is
attended with some nicety, your Lordships will allow mercy to
incline the balance of justice, well considering with the
legislator of the East, 'It is better ten guilty should escape
than that one innocent man should perish in his innocence.'"
The young sailor was acquitted.
To return for a moment to Scott's love-affair. I find him writing as
follows, in March, 1795, to his cousin, William Scott, now Laird of
Raeburn, who was then in the East Indies:--"The lady you allude to has
been in town all this winter, and going a good deal into public, which
has not in the least altered the meekness of her manners. Matters, you
see, stand just as they did."
To another friend he writes thus, from Rosebank, on the 23d of August,
1795:--
It gave me the highest satisfaction to find, by the receipt of
your letter of the 14th current, that you have formed precisely
the same opinion with me, both with regard to the interpretation
of [Miss Stuart's] letter as highly flattering and favorable, and
to the mode of conduct I ought to pursue--for, after all, what
she has pointed out is the most prudent line of conduct for us
both, at least till better days, which, I think myself now
entitled to suppose, she, as well as I myself, will look forward
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