tch and Irish bankers. And "since the
Franco-German war," says Mr. Bagehot, "we may be said to keep the
European reserve also." All great communities have at times to pay large
sums in cash, and of that cash a great store must be kept somewhere.
Formerly, there were two such stores in Europe: one was the Bank of
France, and the other the Bank of England. But since the suspension of
specie payments by the Bank of France its use as a reservoir of specie
is at an end: no one can draw a cheque on it and be sure of getting gold
for it. Accordingly, the whole liability for such international payments
in cash is thrown on the Bank of England. The accumulations secured
ultimately by this bank represent a remarkable share of the national
wealth. England is the only European country where small savers commit
their money to custody: France has never recovered from the timidity
consequent on Law's failure, and still hoards its petty sums in
stockings; Holland and Germany have never felt secure from invasion.
England alone trusts its whole gain to a bank, and demands interest for
it. The vast amount of idle gold distributed through the homes of France
and Germany is not tangible, is not money "of the money market." The
hoards of France can only be tempted from their torpor by a vast
national misfortune and by a great loan in French securities. But the
English money is borrowable money. The British are bold lenders, and
even if they were not so, the mere fact that their money lies in a bank
makes it far more obtainable. Millions in the hand of a banker are a
power, whereas distributed through a nation they cannot be asked for,
and are no power at all. It is thus that Lombard street stands ready to
lend to all civilized or partly civilized governments at different
rates, and builds railways in indigent states all over the world. For,
though "English bankers are not themselves very great lenders to foreign
countries, they are great lenders to those who lend." Rude and poor
countries and undeveloped! colonies find in Lombard street a fund into
which they may dip at a suitable premium, and thus possess a chance of
material felicity which was never the privilege of any previous epoch.
This vast machine, however, the legacy of unnumbered years, is not an
ideally perfect custodian of the wealth entrusted to it. The reforms
called for by a long experience are what the most important part of Mr.
Bagehot's volume is devoted to. Some permanent an