fact is exceedingly instructive, for it proves that the conception
of Christianity set forth by the Apologists was not an individual one,
but the necessary expression of the conviction that Christian truth
contains the completion and guarantee of philosophical knowledge. To
Minucius Felix (and Tertullian) Christian truth chiefly presents itself
as the wisdom implanted by nature in every man (Oct. 16. 5). In so far
as man possesses reason and speech and accomplishes the task of the
"examination of the universe" ("inquisitio universitatis"), conditioned
by this gift, he has the Christian truth, that is, he finds Christianity
in his own constitution, and in the rational order of the world.
Accordingly, Minucius is also able to demonstrate the Christian
doctrines by means of the Stoic principle of knowledge, and arrives at
the conclusion that Christianity is a philosophy, i.e., the true
philosophy, and that philosophers are to be considered Christians in
proportion as they have discovered the truth.[408] Moreover, as he
represented Christian ethics to be the expression of the Stoic, and
depicted the Christian bond of brotherhood as a cosmopolitan union of
philosophers, who have become conscious of their natural
similarity,[409] the revealed character of Christianity appears to be
entirely given up. This religion is natural enlightenment, the
revelation of a truth contained in the world and in man, the discovery
of the one God from the open book of creation. The difference between
him and an Apologist like Tatian seems here to be a radical one. But, if
we look more closely, we find that Minucius--and not less
Tertullian--has abandoned Stoic rationalism in vital points. We may
regard his apologetic aim as his excuse for clearly drawing the logical
conclusions from these inconsistencies himself. However, these
deviations of his from the doctrines of the Stoa are not merely prompted
by Christianity, but rather have already become an essential component
of his philosophical theory of the world. In the first place, Minucius
developed a detailed theory of the pernicious activity of the demons
(cc. 26, 27). This was a confession that human nature was not what it
ought to be, because an evil element had penetrated it from without.
Secondly, he no doubt acknowledged (I. 4: 16. 5) the natural light of
wisdom in humanity, but nevertheless remarked (32. 9) that our thoughts
are darkness when measured by the clearness of God. Finally, and