otnote 390: See Orat. 12 (p. 54 fin.), 20 (p. 90), 25 fin., 26 fin.,
29, 30 (p. 116), 13 (p. 62), 15 (p. 70), 36 (p. 142), 40 (p. 152 sq.).
The section cc. 12-15 of the Oratio is very important (see also c. 7
ff); for it shows that Tatian denied the natural immortality of the
soul, declared the soul (the material spirit) to be something inherent
in all matter, and accordingly looked on the distinction between men and
animals in respect of their inalienable natural constitution as only one
of degree. According to this Apologist the dignity of man does not
consist in his natural endowments: but in the union of the human soul
with the divine spirit, for which union indeed he was planned. But, in
Tatian's opinion, man lost this union by falling under the sovereignty
of the demons. The Spirit of God has left him, and consequently he has
fallen back to the level of the beasts. So it is man's task to unite the
Spirit again with himself, and thereby recover that religious principle
on which all wisdom and knowledge rest. This anthropology is opposed to
that of the Stoics and related to the "Gnostic" theory. It follows from
it that man, in order to reach his destination, must raise himself above
his natural endowment; see c. 15: [Greek: anthropon lego ton porro men
anthroptetos pros auton de ton Theon kechorekota]. But with Tatian this
conception is burdened with radical inconsistency; for he assumes that
the Spirit reunites itself with every man who rightly uses his freedom,
and he thinks it still possible for every person to use his freedom
aright (11 fin., 13 fin., 15 fin.) So it is after all a mere assertion
that the natural man is only distinguished from the beast by speech. He
is also distinguished from it by freedom. And further it is only in
appearance that the blessing bestowed in the "Spirit" is a _donum
superadditum et supernaturale_. For if a proper spontaneous use of
freedom infallibly leads to the return of the Spirit, it is evident that
the decision and consequently the realisation of man's destination
depend on human freedom. That is, however, the proposition which all the
Apologists maintained. But indeed Tatian himself in his latter days
seems to have observed the inconsistency in which he had become involved
and to have solved the problem in the Gnostic, that is, the religious
sense. In his eyes, of course, the ordinary philosophy is a useless and
pernicious art; philosophers make their own opinions laws (c. 27);