in the most radical States of the Union, in their complete adoption of
the whole system of chancery with all its concomitants. As a result,
the injunction writ, originally the high prerogative of the crown and
its highest officers, has now become the weapon of all judges, even
in some States of inferior magistrates, and has been used with a
confusion and recklessness that have gone far to justify the complaint
of labor interests.
On the other hand, we have grown less jealous of preserving our
common-law jury rights. Not only is much more provision made for the
waiver of jury trial in all States, at least in criminal cases,
and for a trial by the court without a jury unless it be specially
claimed, but there is a distinct tendency to have juries less
than twelve in number, and verdicts not unanimous, but made up of
three-fourths, two-thirds, or even a simple majority; while our
indifference to common-law rights shown in our multiplication of
boards and commissioners has already been commented on.
Legislation on the law of evidence has been on two main lines,
originally, of course, under the Federal Constitution, to destroy all
religious tests, and permit an atheist or person of heathen religion
to testify upon simple affirmation, or according to his religious
tenets. Universally, persons charged with crime have been permitted
to testify in their own defence, with the common provision that no
inference shall be drawn from their not doing so. Of course, by
our Constitution itself, they were given the right to counsel and
compulsory process for obtaining evidence on their own behalf, neither
of which rights existed under the old common law; and then almost
universally the wife is permitted to testify against the husband or in
his behalf, especially in cases involving controversy between them;
while, as she is very generally given the right to make contracts even
with the husband, she is naturally given the right to enforce the same
in civil courts as well.
It is in procedure that our legislation is least efficient. Having
little knowledge of the subject, legislatures have been shy of
meddling with court rules and processes; while the very fact that the
legislatures have taken unto themselves the right so to interfere,
has seemed to impress both bench and bar with a certain sense of
irresponsibility. I fear we must admit that the judges of England,
aided by its bar, have been far more solicitous of speedy and simple
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