egistered voters--a proportion which practically makes
the recall impossible. Where, however, the initiative of the recall
depends on a small proportion and the result is determined by a simple
majority vote at the polls, it is easy to see that the mayor or other
official would be in continuous apprehension, if he cared for his
office, and in any event would not be able to adopt and follow out any
continuous policy. The terms of most of our officials are brief. A
proposal to apply the "recall" to judges would, in the opinion of the
writer, be wicked, if not unconstitutional; as to all other officials,
it would tend to destroy their efficiency, and in most cases be in
itself ridiculous, at least as to short-term officers holding for only
one or two years.

One of the most noteworthy of political changes that have occurred in
the republic since the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, is that
affecting the election and tenure of office of judges. Smith, in his
book on American State Constitutions, published shortly after the
Revolution, tells us that at that time every State in the Union had
its judges appointed by the executive for a life term. To-day, this
principle survives only in the Federal courts and four States,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maine, and Delaware, although in
Connecticut, New Jersey, and Mississippi, the judges of the highest,
or Supreme Court, are still appointed in this manner and for life. In
Vermont, Rhode Island, Virginia, and South Carolina, Supreme Court
judges are elected by the two houses of the legislature in joint
convention, but in all other States, that is, universally in the West
and Southwest, the judges are elected by the people of the States or
of their respective districts. New York and Pennsylvania, however,
have very long terms, which by some is said to combine the advantages
of both systems; in other States the term is from four to six years.

In matters judicial the field is far too vast to permit more than
briefest mention of the most important lines of popular legislation.
In the first place, common law and chancery jurisdiction are very
generally fused and confounded. A few States still have chancellors
entirely distinct from the common-law judges, and Massachusetts and
a few other States still keep chancery terms and chancery procedure
distinct from the common law. It is certainly a curious result that
the historic jealousy of chancery and all its works should have ended,