lockaded ports. Its real object is to secure that if
they do come out they shall be observed, shadowed, and followed until
such time as they can be encountered by a superior force, and if
possible destroyed. The classical text on this topic is a letter written
on August 1, 1804, by Nelson to the Lord Mayor of London, acknowledging
a vote of thanks passed by the Corporation, and addressed to Nelson as
commanding the fleet blockading Toulon. Nelson said in his reply: "I beg
to inform your Lordship that the port of Toulon has never been blockaded
by me: quite the reverse--every opportunity has been offered to the
enemy to put to sea, for it is there that we hope to realize the hopes
and expectations of our country, and I trust that they will not be
disappointed." What Nelson here meant was that the so-called blockade of
the port--it was a common, but, as he held, an erroneous expression--was
merely incidental to the operation he was conducting. His main objective
was the armed forces of the enemy lying unassailable within the
blockaded port. He could not make them put to sea but he gave them every
opportunity of doing so. So far from wishing to keep them in, his one
desire was to get them out into the open, "for it is there that we hope
to realize the hopes and expectations of our country"--that is to get a
decision in favour of the British arms.
Now, this being the object of a military blockade, its methods will be
subordinated to that object. In the days of sailing ships the method
which commended itself to the best naval authorities of the time was to
have an inshore squadron, consisting mainly of frigates and smaller
craft, but strengthened if necessary by a few capital ships, generally
two-deckers, closely watching the entrance to the port, but keeping
outside the range of its land defences. This was supported at a greater
distance in the offing by the main blockading fleet of heavier ships of
the line, cruising within narrow limits and keeping close touch with the
inshore squadron. Such a method is no longer practicable owing to the
development of steam navigation, and to the introduction into naval
warfare of the locomotive torpedo, and of special vessels designed to
make the attack of this weapon extremely formidable and extremely
difficult to parry. The inshore squadron of the old days was liable to
no attack which it could not parry if in sufficient force, and if too
hardly pressed it could always fall back on th
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