arfare of first crossing the
enemy's frontier. If that advantage is pushed home and the enemy is
still unready it must lead to a blockade. It is, moreover, quite
possible that even if both belligerents are equally ready--I am here
assuming them to be approximately equal in force--one or other, if not
both, may think it better strategy to await developments before risking
everything in an attempt to secure an immediate decision. In point of
fact, the difference between this policy and the policy of a declared
blockade is, as I am about to show, almost imperceptible, especially in
modern conditions of naval warfare. It is therefore necessary to
consider the subject of blockade more in detail. Other subjects closely
associated with this will also have to be considered in some detail
before we can grasp the full purport and extent of what is meant by the
command of the sea.

There are two kinds of blockade--military and commercial. The former
includes the latter, but the latter does not necessarily involve the
former, except in the sense that armed naval force is necessary to
maintain it. By a commercial blockade a belligerent seeks to intercept
the maritime commerce of the enemy, to prevent any vessels, whether
enemy or neutral, from reaching his ports, and at the same time to
prevent their egress to the same extent. This in certain circumstances
may be a very effective agency for bending or breaking the enemy's will
and compelling his submission, but I reserve its consideration for more
detailed treatment hereafter. It is with military blockade that I am
here more especially concerned.

We have seen that the paramount purpose of all naval warfare, and,
indeed, of all warfare, is the destruction of the armed forces of the
enemy. His armed forces are in the last resort the sole instrument of
his will, and their destruction to such an extent as is necessary to
subdue his will is the sole agency by which peace can be restored.
Whatever the extent of the war, whether it is limited or unlimited, in
the sense assigned to those words by Clausewitz and his followers, the
conflict of national wills out of which the quarrel arose must in some
way be composed, either by concessions on both sides or by the complete
subjection of one side to the other, before it can come to an end. It
follows that the main object of a military blockade can rarely be to
keep the enemy's forces sealed up, masked, and to that extent
immobilized in the b