assume, that the command of the sea must be either surrendered
or imperilled by a superior belligerent who, apparently neglecting
those regions of the sea which are not immediately assailed or
threatened, concentrates his forces in the positions best calculated to
enable him to get the better of his adversary, or who in time of peace
so orders his strategy of position as to secure that advantage at once
should war unhappily break out. Not long ago the Leader of the
Opposition in the House of Commons used the following words:--"Ten years
ago we not only had the command of the sea, but we had the command of
every sea. We have the command of no sea in the world except the North
Sea at this moment." Those who have followed and assimilated the
exposition of the true meaning of the command of the sea given in these
pages will readily discern how mischievous a travesty of that meaning is
contained in these words. There is, as I have shown, no such thing as a
command of the sea in time of peace. The phrase is merely a definition
of the paramount objective of naval warfare as such. Ten years ago we
had no command of any sea because we were not at war with any naval
Power. The concentration of a large portion of our naval forces in the
North Sea is no surrender of our command of the sea in any part of the
world, because that command does not exist, never has existed in time of
peace, and never can exist even in time of war until we have fought for
it and secured it. The concentration in question is, together with the
simultaneous disposition of the residue of our naval forces in different
parts of the world, merely the expression of that peace strategy of
position which, in the judgment of those who are responsible for it, is
best calculated in the more probable, yet possibly quite remote,
contingencies of international conflict, to enable our fleets to get the
better of our enemies and thereby ultimately to secure the command of
the sea in any and every part of the world in which we have maritime
interests to defend. There are, it is true, some disadvantages involved
in a close and sustained concentration of naval forces, especially in
home waters. Naval officers lose in breadth and variety of experience
and in the self-reliance which comes of independent command, while the
prestige of the flag is in some measure diminished by the infrequency of
its appearance in distant seas. But these, after all, are subsidiary
considerations wh