base must be fortified and garrisoned; for, of
course, if the naval guard has been decisively defeated, the control of
maritime communications has passed into the hands of the enemy, and
nothing but the advance of a relieving naval force, too strong for the
enemy to resist, can prevent the base being invested from the sea and
ultimately reduced. It will be seen from this how absurd it is ever to
speak of a naval base as commanding the adjacent seas. As such it does
not command, and never can command, any portion of the sea which lies
beyond the range of its own guns. All that it ever does or can do is, by
its resources for repair, refit, and supply, to enable the fleet based
upon it constantly to renew its efficiency and mobility, and thereby to
discharge its appointed task of controlling the maritime communications
entrusted to its keeping. But such command is in all cases exercised by
the fleet and not by the base. If the fleet is not there or not equal to
its task, the mere possession of the base is nearly always a source of
weakness and not of strength to the naval Power which holds it.

It is held by some that the occupation of naval bases in distant seas by
a Power which is not strong enough to make sure of controlling the
maritime communications which alone give to such bases their strategic
value and importance is a great advantage to such a Power and a
corresponding disadvantage to all its possible adversaries in war. It
will readily be seen from what has been said that this is in large
measure a delusion. As against a weaker adversary than itself the
occupation of such bases may be an appreciable advantage to the Power
which holds them, but only if the adversary in question has in the
waters affected interests which are too important to be sacrificed
without a struggle. On the other hand, as against an adversary strong
enough to secure the command of the sea and determined to hold it at all
hazards, the occupation of such distant bases can very rarely be of any
advantage to the weaker belligerent and may very often expose him to
reverses which, if not positively disastrous, must always be
exceedingly mortifying. Of two things one. Either the belligerent in
such a plight must detach a naval force sufficient to cover the outlying
base, and thus, by dispersing naval forces which he desired to keep
concentrated, he must expose his detachment to destruction by a stronger
force of the enemy, or he must leave the bas