that direction may
produce in him a fear which in the future man may become terrible
depression and lead to degradation.

Sec. 37. If to censure we add the threat of punishment, we have then what
in common language is called scolding.

If threats are made, the pupil must be made to feel that they will be
faithfully executed according to the word.

The threat of punishment is, however, to be avoided; for circumstances
may arise which will render its fulfillment not only objectionable, but
wrong, and the teacher will then find himself in the position of Herod
and bound "for his oath's sake" to a course of action which no longer
seems the best. Even the law in affixing a penalty to definite crimes
allows a certain latitude in a maximum and minimum of awarded
punishment.

Sec. 38. It is only after other means of reformation have been tried, and
have failed, that punishment is justifiable for error, transgression, or
vice. When our simple prohibition (Sec. 36), the statement of our reason
for the prohibiting (Sec. 36), and threat of punishment (Sec. 37) have all
failed, then punishment comes and intentionally inflicts pain on the
youth in order to force him by this last means to a realization of his
wrong-doing. And here the punishment must not be given for general bad
conduct or for a perverse disposition--those being vague
generalities--but for a special act of wrong-doing at that time. He
should not be punished because he is naturally bad or because he is
generally naughty, but for this one special and particular act which he
has committed. Thus the punishment will act on the general disposition,
not directly, but through this particular act, as a manifestation of the
disposition. Then it will not accuse the innermost nature of the
culprit. This way of punishment is not only demanded by justice, but it
is absolutely necessary in view of the fact of the sophistry inherent in
human nature which is always busy in assigning various motives for its
actions. If the child understands, then, that he is punished for that
particular act which he knows himself to have committed, he cannot feel
the bitter sense of injustice and misunderstanding which a punishment
inflicted for general reasons, and which attributes to him a depravity
of motives and intentions, so often engenders.

Sec. 39. Punishment as an educational means must, nevertheless, be always
essentially corrective, since it seeks always to bring the youth to a
compre