ure from itself as
individual.

The animal is a preservation of individuality as regards space. He
returns into himself in the form of _feeling_ or _sensibility_; but as
regards time, it is not so--feeling being limited to the present.
Without a higher activity than feeling, there is no continuity of
individuality in the animal any more than in the plant. Each new moment
is a new beginning to a being that has feeling, but not memory.

Thus the individuality of mere feeling, although a far more perfect
realization of individuality than that found in plant life, is yet,
after all, not a continuous individuality for itself, but only for the
species.

In spite of the ideal self-activity which appertains to feeling, even
in sense-perception, only the species lives in the animal and the
individual dies, unless there be higher forms of activity.

IV.

Representation is the next form above sense-perception.
The lowest phase of representation is recollection, which
simply repeats for itself a former sense-perception or
series of sense-perceptions; in representation the mind is
free as regards external impressions; it does not require
the presence of the object, but recalls it without its own
time and place; fancy and imagination are next higher than
recollection, because the mind not only recalls images,
but makes new combinations of them, or creates them
altogether; attention is the appearance of the will in the
intellect; with attention begins the separation of the
transient from the variable in perception; memory is the
highest form of representation; memory deals with general
forms--not mere images of experience, but general types of
objects of perception; memory, in this sense, is
productive as well as reproductive; with memory arises
language.

Here we pass over to the consideration of higher forms of intellect and
will.

While mere sensation, as such, acts only in the presence of the
object--reproducing (ideally), it is true, the external object, the
faculty of representation is a higher form of self-activity (or of
reaction against surrounding conditions), because it can recall, at its
own pleasure, the ideal object. Here is the beginning of emancipation
from the limitations of time.

The self-activity of representation can summon before it the object that
is no longer present to it. Hence its activity is now a double one, for
it can seize not only what is now and here im