h Major Davie and other officers, and
make a vigorous attack against the post of Hanging Rock. This post
derives its name from a huge conglomerate bowlder of granite,
twenty-five or thirty feet in diameter, lying upon the eastern bank of
Hanging Rock Creek, with a concavity sufficiently large to shelter
fifty men from the rain, Near this natural curiosity Lord Rawdon, then
commanding the British and Tories in that section, had established a
post, garrisoned by Tarleton's Legion of infantry, a part of Brown's
Corps of South Carolina and Georgia Provincials, and Colonel Bryan's
North Carolina Loyalists, the whole under the command of Major Carden.

BATTLE OF THE HANGING ROCK.

"Catawba's waters smiled again
To see her Sumter's soul in arms!
And issuing from each glade and glen,
Rekindled by war's fierce alarms,
Thronged hundreds through the solitude
Of the wild forests, to the call
Of him whose spirit, unsubdued,
Fresh impulse gave to each, to all."

On the 5th of August, 1780, the detachments of the patriots met again
at Land's Ford, on the Catawba. Major Davie had not lost a single man
in his last dashing exploit. The North Carolina militia, under Colonel
Irwin and Major Davie, numbered about five hundred men, officers and
privates; and about three hundred South Carolinians under Colonels
Sumter, Lacey and Hill. The chief command was conferred upon Colonel
Sumter, as being the senior officer. Early in the morning, Colonel
Sumter marched cautiously, and approached the British camp in three
divisions, with the intention of falling upon the main body stationed
at Cole's Old Field. The right was composed of Major Davie's corps,
and some volunteers, under Major Bryan; the center, of the Mecklenburg
militia, under Colonel Irwin; and the left, of South Carolina
refugees, under Colonel Hill. General Sumter proposed that the
detachments should approach in their divisions, march directly to the
centre encampments, then dismount, and each division attack its camp.
This plan was approved by all except Major Davie, who insisted on
leaving their horses at their present position, and march to the
attack on foot. He urged, as an objection against the former plan, the
confusion always consequent upon dismounting under fire, and the
certainty of losing the effect of a sudden and vigorous attack. He
was, however, over-ruled, but the sequel proved he was right in his
opinion. Through th