on Aristotle in
thirty-five quarto volumes. The best work on Aristotle is that by E.
Zeller, in Vol. iii. of his 'Philosophie der Griechen.' The English
works by Lewes and Grote are inferior. For Bibliography, the student may
consult Ueberweg, 'Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic,' Vol. i.,
pages 196 _seq_.

[Illustration: Signature: THOMAS DAVIDSON]

THE NATURE OF THE SOUL

From 'On the Soul,' Book iii., Chapter 6

Concerning that part of the soul, however, by which the soul knows (and
is prudentially wise) whether it is separable or not separable,
according to magnitude, but according to reason, it must be considered
what difference it possesses, and how intellectual perception is
produced. If, therefore, to perceive intellectually is the same thing as
to perceive sensibly, it will either be to suffer something from the
intelligible, or something else of this kind. It is necessary, however,
that it should be impassive, but capable of receiving form; and in
capacity a thing of this kind, but not this; and also, that as the
sensitive power is to sensibles, so should intellect be to
intelligibles. It is necessary, therefore, since it understands all
things, that it should be unmingled, as Anaxagoras says, that it may
predominate: but this is that it may know; for that which is foreign at
the same time presenting itself to the view, impedes and obstructs.

Hence, neither is there any other nature of it than this, that it is
possible. That, therefore, which is called the intellect of soul (I mean
the intellect by which the soul energizes dianoetically and
hypoleptically), is nothing in energy of beings before it intellectually
perceives them. Hence, neither is it reasonable that it should be
mingled with body; for thus it would become a thing with certain
quality, would be hot or cold, and would have a certain organ in the
same manner as the sensitive power. Now, however, there is no organ of
it. In a proper manner, therefore, do they speak, who say that the soul
is the place of forms; except that this is not true of the whole soul,
but of that which is intellective; nor is it forms in entelecheia, but
in capacity. But that the impassivity of the sensitive and intellective
power is not similar, is evident in the sensoria and in sense. For sense
cannot perceive from a vehement sensible object (as for instance, sounds
from very loud sounds; nor from strong odors and colors can it either
see or smell): but in