enaissance, from which he cannot, I
think, be dissociated.

But in clearing up and defining these progressive ideas, he made a
contribution to the development of human thought which had far-reaching
importance and has a special significance for our present subject. In
the hopes of a steady increase of knowledge, based on the application of
new methods, he had been anticipated by Roger Bacon, and further back
by Seneca. But with Francis Bacon this idea of the augmentation of
knowledge has an entirely new value. For Seneca the exploration of
nature was a means of escaping from the sordid miseries of life. For the
friar of Oxford the principal use of increasing knowledge was to prepare
for the coming of Antichrist. Francis Bacon sounded the modern note; for
him the end of knowledge is utility. [Footnote; The passages specially
referred to are: De Aug. Sc. vii. i; Nov. Org. i. 81 and 3.]

2.

The principle that the proper aim of knowledge is the amelioration
of human life, to increase men's happiness and mitigate their
sufferings--commodis humanis inservire--was the guiding star of Bacon
in all his intellectual labour. He declared the advancement of "the
happiness of mankind" to be the direct purpose of the works he had
written or designed. He considered that all his predecessors had gone
wrong because they did not apprehend that the finis scientarum, the real
and legitimate goal of the sciences, is "the endowment of human life
with new inventions and riches"; and he made this the test for defining
the comparative values of the various branches of knowledge.

The true object, therefore, of the investigation of nature is not, as
the Greek philosophers held, speculative satisfaction, but to establish
the reign of man over nature; and this Bacon judged to be attainable,
provided new methods of attacking the problems were introduced. Whatever
may be thought of his daring act in bringing natural science down from
the clouds and assigning to her the function of ministering to the
material convenience and comfort of man, we may criticise Bacon for his
doctrine that every branch of science should be pursued with a single
eye towards practical use. Mathematics, he thought, should conduct
herself as a humble, if necessary, handmaid, without any aspirations
of her own. But it is not thus that the great progress in man's command
over nature since Bacon's age has been effected. Many of the most
valuable and surprising things which s