ed the disputed constitutional question in your favor.
Not quite so. But, waiving the lawyer's distinction between dictum and
decision, the court have decided the question for you in a sort of way.
The court have substantially said it is your constitutional right to take
slaves into the Federal Territories, and to hold them there as property.
When I say, the decision was made in a sort of way, I mean it was made
in a divided court, by a bare majority of the judges, and they not quite
agreeing with one another in the reasons for making it; that it is so made
as that its avowed supporters disagree with one another about its meaning,
and that it was mainly based upon a mistaken statement of fact--the
statement in the opinion that "the right of property in a slave is
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution."

An inspection of the Constitution will show that the right of property in
a slave is not "distinctly and expressly affirmed" in it. Bear in mind,
the judges do not pledge their judicial opinion that such right is
impliedly affirmed in the Constitution; but they pledge their veracity
that it is "distinctly and expressly" affirmed there--"distinctly," that
is, not mingled with anything else; "expressly," that is, in words meaning
just that, without the aid of any inference, and susceptible of no other
meaning.

If they had only pledged their judicial opinion that such right is
affirmed in the instrument by implication, it would be open to others to
show that neither the word "slave" nor "slavery" is to be found in
the Constitution, nor the word "property" even, in any connection with
language alluding to the things slave or slavery; and that wherever in
that instrument the slave is alluded to, he is called a "person"; and
wherever his master's legal right in relation to him is alluded to, it
is spoken of as "service or labor which may be due," as a debt payable
in service or labor. Also, it would be open to show, by contemporaneous
history, that this mode of alluding to slaves and slavery, instead of
speaking of them, was employed on purpose to exclude from the Constitution
the idea that there could be property in man.

To show all this, is easy and certain.

When this obvious mistake of the judges shall be brought to their notice,
is it not reasonable to expect that they will withdraw the mistaken
statement, and reconsider the conclusion based upon it?

And then it is to be remembered that "our fathers