dventurer who on any pretext could make a showing of party
service rendered, poured into Washington. It was a motley horde.
"Hark, hark, the dogs do bark,
The beggars are coming to town."
They converted the White House into a leaguer. They swarmed into the
corridors and even the private passages. So dense was the swarm that
it was difficult to make one's way either in or out. Lincoln described
himself by the image of a man renting rooms at one end of his house
while the other end was on fire.(4) And all this while the existence of
the Republic was at stake! It did not occur to him that it was safe to
defy the horde, to send it about its business. Here again, the figure of
Seward stood out in brilliant light against the somber background. One
of Seward's faculties was his power to form devoted lieutenants. He had
that sure and nimble judgment which enables some men to inspire their
lieutenants rather than categorically to instruct them. All the sordid
side of his political games he managed in this way. He did not appear
himself as the bargainer. In the shameful eagerness of most of the
politicians to find offices for their retainers, Seward was conspicuous
by contrast. Even the Cabinet was not free from this vice of catering to
the thirsty horde.(5) Alone, at this juncture, Seward detached himself
from the petty affairs of the hour and gave his whole attention to
statecraft.
He had a definite policy. Another point of contact with Lincoln was the
attitude of both toward the Union, supplemented as it was by their
views of the place of slavery in the problem they confronted. Both were
nationalists ready to make any sacrifices for the national idea. Both
regarded slavery as an issue of second importance. Both were prepared
for great concessions if convinced that, ultimately, their concessions
would strengthen the trend of American life toward a general exaltation
of nationality.
On the other hand, their differences--
Seward approached the problem in the same temper, with the same
assumptions, that were his in the previous December. He still believed
that his main purpose was to enable a group of politicians to save their
faces by effecting a strategic retreat. Imputing to the Southern leaders
an attitude of pure self-interest, he believed that if allowed to play
the game as they desired, they would mark time until circumstances
revealed to them whether there was more profit for them in the Union or
out;
|