the German army marched in the direction of Paris at
great speed, and the rapidity of the German onslaught obliged the French
General Staff to prolong the retreat until they were able to establish a
new alignment of forces. The new army established on the left of the
French armies, and intrusted to General Manoury, was not able to
complete its concentration in the localities first intended. In place of
concentrating in the region of Amiens it was obliged to operate more to
the south.

The situation on the evening of September 2, 1914, as a result of the
vigorous onward march of the German right, was as follows:

A corps of German cavalry had crossed the Oise and had reached Chateau
Thierry. The First German Army (General von Kluck), consisting of four
active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiegne. The Second
Army (General von Buelow), with three active army corps and two reserve
corps, had attained to the region of Laon. The Third German Army
(General von Hausen), with two active army corps and a reserve corps,
had crossed the Aisne and reached Chateau Porcin-Attigny.

Farther to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German Armies,
making about twelve active army corps, four reserve corps, and numerous
Ersatz companies, were in contact with the French troops (Fourth and
Fifth Armies) between Vouziers and Verdun, the others from Verdun to the
Vosges. Such was the situation.

It may be seen, if a map is consulted, that the Fifth French Army,
commanded from August 30 by General Franchet d'Esperey, would have found
itself in grave peril following on the backward bending of the British
and French forces operating on its left, if the French had accepted the
challenge of a decisive battle. The French commander in chief resolutely
chose the alternative that obviated such a risk, that is, he decided on
a postponement of the offensive and the continuation of the retreat.

Already on September 1, 1914, he prescribed as the extreme limits of the
retreat the line running through Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine,
Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-Francois, and the region north of Bar-le-Duc.
That line would have been reached had it been necessary. On the other
hand, it was his intention to attack before it was reached if the forces
could be offensively arrayed, allowing of the cooperation of the British
army and the army of Manoury on the left, and on the right that of the
divisions of reserve that had been held on