een a mistake. The blundering official
in Whitehall should have seen the dignified sorrow with which Yugoslavia
heard of her great Ally's unjustifiable procedure. So much faith have
the Southern Slavs always had in the Entente's sense of justice that
from 1914 to 1918 they continued to give their all, without making any
agreement or stipulation; more than once the Serbian Government had the
offer of terms from the Central Powers, but on each occasion, as for
example during the dark days at Ni[vs] in 1915, they declined to betray
their Allies.

Mr. Fisher announced that the British Government's action was in no way
caused by feelings of hostility against the Southern Slavs. All
Englishmen, in fact, remembered the heroism and fortitude of the Serbs;
they cherished for Yugoslavia the warmest sympathy. In Mr. Fisher's own
case it might conceivably have been a little warmer--he was not ashamed
to repeat the reasons which had induced Great Britain to summon the
Council of the League. Yet he must have known the comment that he would
arouse among his audience when they heard him base his arguments
exclusively upon reports of the Tirana Government, while those of
Belgrade were ignored; and in their place the delegate thought fit to
bring up various extracts which had been collected from the Belgrade
Press. If every organ of this Press were filled with a permanent sense
of high responsibility, and if Mr. Fisher had made inquiries as to the
existence in Belgrade of humorous and ironic writers, one is still
rather at a loss to understand why these miscellaneous cuttings were
placed before the League, which could scarcely be expected to treat them
as evidence. The delegate added that he did not think a single nation
was animated by unfriendly sentiments towards the Southern Slavs--so
that Italy's unflagging efforts to strengthen the Tirana Government's
army were prompted purely by the deep love which the Italians--despite
their having been flung out of Valona--bear for the Shqyptart. Mr.
Fisher proceeded to say that no better proof was needed of the general
friendship for the Southern Slavs than the decision of the Ambassadors'
Conference which, instead of allotting to Albania the frontiers of 1913,
a method that would have been simpler, had resolved on several
rectifications in favour of Yugoslavia, in order to prevent disturbances
on Albania's northern frontier. After what Mr. Fisher had already had
the heart to say we cannot real