the human system, there exists a principle which constitutes
true pleasure, that principle must be that which constitutes human
excellence; and, if the visible object which excites true pleasure
must necessarily possess the principles of true pleasure, then must
every object, which universally and invariably pleases, be relative to
the principle that constitutes human excellence, morality.

Whatever appears, to each individual, the most excellent in the human
system, at once constitutes his idea of _happiness_, of _morality_,
and of _beauty_; and all mankind, I imagine, would agree in the same
idea, had all the same opportunities of seeing and knowing what was
excellent.

As I imagine the difference in national beauty is marked by the
difference in national morals, so, of course, must the difference of
the opinions of individuals on the subject of beauty be. In fine,
as the moral sense of mankind is coarse or refined, so will be their
taste of beauty.

Of this I am certain, that true refinement is the effect of true
virtue; that virtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells in
them, and they in her.

CHAPTER III

On TASTE.

Taste seems to be an inherent impulsive tendency of the soul towards
true good, given by nature to all alike, and which improves in its
sentiment as the reasoning faculties improve in their knowledge of
what _is_ true good.

All the human faculties are, as one may say, constituents of the
principle or faculty of taste. But its perception seems to be shared
between the judgement and the imagination: to the former seems to
belong the truth, or good, of an object of taste; to the latter its
beauty or grace; and the stamina vitae, or radical principles of taste,
exist, I imagine, in the natural affections of the soul.

What the impulsive spring is, which moves the affections invariably to
perceive pleasure in the perception of good and beauty, and disgust
in the perception of evil or deformity, I leave to my metaphysical
readers to determine. I am afraid to give it an appellation so
incongruous to the general idea of taste, as that of conscience.

Yet, however absurd it may appear, I will venture to say, that, if
my readers will give themselves the trouble to analyse the grateful
sensation or sentiment, we call _taste_ i.e. their sentiment of what
is truly good, beautiful, right, just, ornamental, honourable, &c.
&c. they will find it to originate from, and end in, some moral or