true ornament seems
equally to partake of the idea of utility and superfluity, and every
sentiment of taste seems equally to partake of the idea of novelty and
of custom; for, were the object perfectly familiar to us, we should
feel no degree of admiration, without which we could feel no sentiment
of taste; and, were it totally new, unlike any thing we had ever seen,
it would excite wonder instead of admiration, which is a sentiment as
distant from taste as the love of fame is from the love of honour.
This sphere, the last in my scale of the perceptions of taste, and
which borders upon every thing that is contrary to its laws, is
properly the sphere of Fancy, who seems an undisciplined offspring of
Taste; sometimes sporting within the bounds of parental authority, and
sometimes beyond them. Fancy seems to bear the same affinity to Taste
as Pleasure does to Happiness.
Every object of taste is relative to some principle of excellence
from which it derives its power of pleasing; of course, the highest
sentiment of taste must exist in the relative principle to our highest
object of excellence.
True ornament is, to the eye, what eloquence is to the ear: their
principles throughout are one, the truth or beauty of which exists in
its exact relation or adaptation to the object it adorns, constituting
the _just_, the _true_, the _beautiful_, objects, or qualities,
which, in the conscious eye of taste, _relate_ to moral beauty. The
perception of the first relation, i.e. the adaptation of any thing
ornamental to the object it adorns, may, in a great measure, be
learned by habit and general observation; but the higher relation,
the second concoction (as one may say) of its principles, the moral
relation, is the immediate operation of taste.
Ornament and harmonious sound are pleasing to the corporeal sense,
but, when wanting a relative object, please but for a short time; and,
if incongruously joined to an object, i.e. to one with which it can
have no relation, will, as soon as the understanding perceives the
incongruity, become a principle of disgust.
As the virtues differ, in some degree, as the character of the sexes
differ,[A] of course so must the sentiment of taste differ. To the
man I would give the laws of taste; to the woman, its sensibility. The
taste of the former seems more derived from reason; that of the
latter from instinct: witness their impulsive maternal affection; that
inherent ornament of their sex, m
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