perception, which the consistency of truth does, in the _intire_ of an
object.

Every object of taste has _at least_ a double reference to mental
pleasure, whether the object, in the philosophical scale of our
perceptions, belongs to those of _sense_ or _intellect_. Thus, the
beauty of the rose would not certainly be so perceptible to us,
wanting its fragrance, and, with a nauseous smell, would not probably
be admitted, as I may say, into the rank of _agreeableness_, though
it is in reality a beautiful and pleasing object; nor, supposing the
thistle, or any other ugly flower, possessed of the fragrance of the
rose, should we therefore think it an object of taste, any more than
we can think the form of an elephant beautiful, though endued with
almost intellectual beauty.

In the form and colour of flowers, there appears to me a striking
analogy to the character of human beauty. They afford an ocular
demonstration, in the pleasure with which we contemplate their
particular forms, that the pleasure, we receive from the beauty of the
human form, originates from mental character: witness the charm of
the infant, innocence of the snow-drop, of the soft elegance of the
hyacinth, &c. and, on the contrary, our dis-relish of the gaudy tulip,
the robust, unmeaning, masculine, piony, hollyhock, &c. &c.

It is, I imagine, from a resemblance to some pre-conceived idea of
beauty in the human species, that we are particularly pleased with
the sight of one flower more than with another, though the mind
is unconscious of the cause. And thus the pleasure, caused by the
apparent beauty of every object throughout the system of human
perception, is, according to my sentiment of that pleasure, the same
intellectual principle, _moral good_, however diversified, modified,
and diminished, even to an unconsciousness or almost imperceptible
degree of relation to it. In fine, the true principles of beauty, in
every object, may be all _resolved_ into the same principle. But to
conclude.

I have no more doubt that the principles of beauty are moral, than
that the principles of happiness are moral. It is the perception of
true beauty, in its various modifications, that makes up the sum
of human happiness; and hence the diversity of opinions concerning
beauty, but which, however diverse, are never contradictory, but as
mens opinions in morals are so; for every view of beauty assimilates
with some good, and of course must be in unison.

If, in