tioned and become a law, what practical
constitutional restraint can hereafter be imposed upon the most extended
system of internal improvements by the Federal Government in all parts
of the Union. The Constitution has not, in my judgment, conferred upon
the Federal Government the power to construct works of internal
improvement within the States, or to appropriate money from the Treasury
for that purpose. That this bill assumes for the Federal Government the
right to exercise this power can not, I think, be doubted. The approved
course of the Government and the deliberately expressed judgment of the
people have denied the existence of such a power under the Constitution.
Several of my predecessors have denied its existence in the most solemn
forms.

The general proposition that the Federal Government does not possess
this power is so well settled and has for a considerable period been so
generally acquiesced in that it is not deemed necessary to reiterate the
arguments by which it is sustained. Nor do I deem it necessary, after
the full and elaborate discussions which have taken place before the
country on this subject, to do more than to state the general
considerations which have satisfied me of the unconstitutionality and
inexpediency of the exercise of such a power.

It is not questioned that the Federal Government is one of limited
powers. Its powers are such, and such only, as are expressly granted in
the Constitution or are properly incident to the expressly granted
powers and necessary to their execution. In determining whether a given
power has been granted a sound rule of construction has been laid down
by Mr. Madison. That rule is that--

Whenever a question arises concerning a particular power, the first
question is whether the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it
be, the question is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry
must be whether it is properly an incident to an expressed power and
necessary to its execution. If it be, it may be exercised by Congress.
If it be not, Congress can not exercise it.

It is not pretended that there is any express grant in the Constitution
conferring on Congress the power in question. Is it, then, an incidental
power necessary and proper for the execution of any of the granted
powers? All the granted powers, it is confidently affirmed, may be
effectually executed without the aid of such an incident. "A power, to
be incidental, must not