ur it is received, and inform me what your action will be, so that we
may take measures to aid in river and railroad transportation.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1862.

GENERAL BURNSIDE:

I think you had better go, with any reinforcements you can spare, to
General McClellan.

A. LINCOLN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June, 28, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Newbern:

We have intelligence that General McClellan has been attacked in large
force and compelled to fall back toward the James River. We are not
advised of his exact condition, but the President directs that you shall
send him all the reinforcements from your command to the James River that
you can safely do without abandoning your own position. Let it be infantry
entirely, as he said yesterday that he had cavalry enough.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, June 28, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Save your army, at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as we can.
Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not
said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements. I thought
you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I
could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you
feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is
the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected
Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington,
he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you.
Less than a week ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving
Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither
you nor the government is to blame. Please tell at once the present
condition and aspect of things.

A. LINCOLN

TO SECRETARY SEWARD.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 28, 1862

HON. W. H. SEWARD.

MY DEAR SIR:--My view of the present condition of the war is about as
follows:

The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the Chickahominy
have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Richmond
for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact there soon will be no
substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from
here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know of it, send