generosity to us and your devotion to liberal principles
generally.

You are quite right as to the importance to us, for its bearing upon
Europe, that we should achieve military successes, and the same is true
for us at home as well as abroad. Yet it seems unreasonable that a series
of successes, extending through half a year, and clearing more than
100,000 square miles of country, should help us so little, while a single
half-defeat should hurt us so much. But let us be patient.

I am very happy to know that my course has not conflicted with your
judgment of propriety and policy I can only say that I have acted upon my
best convictions, without selfishness or malice, and that by the help of
God I shall continue to do so.

Please be assured of my highest respect and esteem.

A. LINCOLN.

SPEECH AT A WAR MEETING, WASHINGTON, AUGUST 6, 1862

FELLOW CITIZENS: I believe there is no precedent for my appearing before
you on this occasion, but it is also true that there is no precedent for
your being here yourselves, and I offer in justification of myself and
of you that, upon examination, I have found nothing in the Constitution
against it. I, however, have an impression that; there are younger
gentlemen who will entertain you better and better address your
understanding than I will or could, and therefore I propose but to detain
you a moment longer. I am very little inclined on any occasion to say
anything unless I hope to produce some good by it. The only thing I think
of just now not likely to be better said by some one else is a matter in
which we have heard some other persons blamed for what I did myself There
has been a very widespread attempt to have a quarrel between General
McClellan and the Secretary of War Now, I occupy a position that enables
me to believe that these two gentlemen are not nearly so deep in the
quarrel as some presuming to be their friends. General McClellan's
attitude is such that in the very selfishness of his nature he cannot but
wish to be successful--and I hope he will--and the Secretary of War is
precisely in the same situation. If the military commanders in the field
cannot be successful, not only the Secretary of War, but myself, for the
time being the master of both, cannot but be failures. I know General
McClellan wishes to be successful, and I know he does not wish it any more
than the Secretary of War for him, and both of them together no more
than I wish it. Sometimes we