to slaves, while commenting on the first and
second sections, is applicable to the ninth, with the difference that no
provision is made in the whole act for determining whether a particular
individual slave does or does not fall within the classes defined in
that section. He is to be free upon certain conditions but whether
those conditions do or do not pertain to him no mode of ascertaining is
provided. This could be easily supplied.

To the tenth section I make no objection. The oath therein required seems
to be proper, and the remainder of the section is substantially identical
with a law already existing.

The eleventh section simply assumes to confer discretionary power upon
the executive. Without the law, I have no hesitation to go as far in the
direction indicated as I may at any time deem expedient. And I am ready
to say now--I think it is proper for our military commanders to employ, as
laborers, as many persons of African descent as can be used to advantage.

The twelfth and thirteenth sections are something better than
unobjectionable; and the fourteenth is entirely proper, if all other parts
of the act shall stand.

That to which I chiefly object pervades most parts of the act, but more
distinctly appears in the first, second, seventh, and eighth sections.
It is the sum of those provisions which results in the divesting of title
forever.

For the causes of treason and ingredients of treason, not amounting to
the full crime, it declares forfeiture extending beyond the lives of the
guilty parties; whereas the Constitution of the United States declares
that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture
except during the life of the person attainted." True, there is to be
no formal attainder in this case; still, I think the greater punishment
cannot be constitutionally inflicted, in a different form, for the same
offence.

With great respect I am constrained to say I think this feature of the act
is unconstitutional. It would not be difficult to modify it.

I may remark that the provision of the Constitution, put in language
borrowed from Great Britain, applies only in this country, as I
understand, to real or landed estate.

Again, this act in rem forfeits property for the ingredients of treason
without a conviction of the supposed criminal, or a personal hearing given
him in any proceeding. That we may not touch property lying within our
reach, because we cannot give personal n