dvances of the nationalists were
steady, their battles being won against enormous odds by the force of
their warlike nature, which sought honor above all things, and could,
in the words of a medieval chronicle, "endure without a murmur
watchings and pains, hunger and cold, in its pursuit--which could even
face death without a pang." Finally it became necessary, as the result
of unparalleled success in domestic affairs, that a foreign policy
should be formulated. Paoli's idea was an offensive and defensive
alliance with France on terms recognizing the independence of Corsica,
securing an exclusive commercial reciprocity between them, and
promising military service with an annual tribute from the island.
This idea of France as a protector without administrative power was
held by the majority of patriots.

But Choiseul, the minister of foreign affairs under Louis XV, would
entertain no such visionary plan. It was clear to every one that the
island could no longer be held by its old masters. He had found a
facile instrument for the measures necessary to his contemplated
seizure of it in the son of a Corsican refugee, that later notorious
Buttafuoco, who, carrying water on both shoulders, had ingratiated
himself with his father's old friends, while at the same time he had
for years been successful as a French official. Corsica was to be
seized by France as a sop to the national pride, a slight compensation
for the loss of Canada, and he was willing to be the agent. On August
sixth, 1764, was signed a provisional agreement between Genoa and
France by which the former was to cede for four years all her rights
of sovereignty, and the few places she still held in the island, in
return for the latter's intervention to thwart Paoli's plan for
securing virtual independence. At the end of the period France was to
pay Genoa the millions owed to her.

By this time the renown of Paoli had filled all Europe. As a statesman
he had skilfully used the European entanglements both of the
Bourbon-Hapsburg alliance made in 1756, and of the alliances
consequent to the Seven Years' War, for whatever possible advantage
might be secured to his people and their cause. As a general he had
found profit even in defeat, and had organized his little forces to
the highest possible efficiency, displaying prudence, fortitude, and
capacity. His personal character was blameless, and could be
fearlessly set up as a model. He was a convincing orator and a wi