rs was communicated to Paoli.
Choiseul explained through his agent that by its first section the
King guaranteed the safety and liberty of the Corsican nation. But, no
doubt, he forgot to explain the double dealing in the second section.
Thereby in the Italian form the Corsicans were in return to take "all
right and proper measures dictated by their sense of justice and
natural moderation to secure the glory and interest of the republic of
Genoa," while in the French form they were "to yield to the Genoese
all 'they' thought necessary to the glory and interests of their
republic." Who were the "they"?--the Corsicans or the Genoese? Paoli's
eye was fixed on the acknowledgment of Corsican independence; he was
hoodwinked completely as to the treachery in this second section, the
meaning of which, according to diplomatic usage, was settled by the
interpretation which the language employed for one form put upon that
in which the other was written. Combining the two translations,
Italian and French, of the second section, and interpreting one by the
other, the Genoese were still the arbiters of Corsican conduct and the
promise of liberty contained in the first section was worthless.

Four years passed: apparently they were uneventful, but in reality
Choiseul made good use of his time. Through Buttafuoco he was in
regular communication with that minority among the Corsicans which
desired incorporation. By the skilful manipulation of private feuds,
and the unstinted use of money, this minority was before long turned
into a majority. Toward the close of 1767 Choiseul began to show his
hand by demanding absolute possession for France of at least two
strong towns. Paoli replied that the demand was unexpected, and
required consideration by the people; the answer was that the King of
France could not be expected to mingle in Corsican affairs without
some advantage for himself. To gain time, Paoli chose Buttafuoco as
his plenipotentiary, despatched him to Versailles, and thus fell into
the very trap so carefully set for him by his opponent. He consented
as a compromise that Corsica should join the Bourbon-Hapsburg league.
More he could not grant for love of his wild, free Corsicans, and he
cherished the secret conviction that, Genoa being no longer able to
assert her sovereignty, France would never allow another power to
intervene, and so, for the sake of peace, might accept this solution.

But the great French minister was a master