n detail to be
overpowered.
The left attack was assigned to Jackson, the right to Magruder,
supported by Huger and Holmes--Longstreet and A.P. Hill in reserve.
Jackson's dispositions were as follows: On the extreme left, the
division of Whiting, then artillery supported by a brigade under Wade
Hampton, my brigade, and on my right the division of D.H. Hill. In
reserve were the remainder of Ewell's division and the brigades of
Winder, Lawton, and Cunningham. It was perhaps 3 o'clock of the
afternoon before these dispositions were completed.
As it was General Lee's intention to open from his right, Magruder was
waited for, who, following Jackson on the road, was necessarily later in
getting into position. Orders were for Hill to attack with the bayonet
as soon as he heard the cheers of Magruder's charge. To be ready, Hill
advanced over open ground to some timber within four hundred yards of
the enemy's line, but suffered in doing so. Artillery sent to his
support was crippled and driven off. It was 5 o'clock or after when a
loud shout and some firing were heard on the right, and, supposing this
to be Magruder's attack, Hill led his men to the charge. He carried the
first line of the enemy, who, unoccupied elsewhere, reenforced at once,
and Hill was beaten off with severe loss. The brigades of Trimble,
Lawton, Winder, and Cunningham were sent to his assistance, but could
accomplish nothing beyond holding the ground. About sunset, after Hill's
attack had failed, Magruder got into position and led on his men with
similar fortune. Like Hill, he and his troops displayed superb courage
and suffered enormously; but it was not to be; such partial attacks were
without the first element of success. My brigade was not moved from its
position, but experienced some loss by artillery.
After the action, Stuart arrived from the north side of the
Chickahominy, where he had been since Cold Harbor. Had he been brought
over the Long Bridge two days earlier, McClellan's huge trains on the
Charles City road would have fallen an easy prey to his cavalry, and he
could have blocked the roads through the forest.
McClellan's guns continued firing long after nightfall, but the ensuing
morning found him and his army at Harrison's Landing, in an impregnable
position. Here ended the campaign around Richmond.
The strategy displayed on the Confederate side was magnificent, and gave
opportunity for resplendent success; but this opportunity was lo
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