ing the process which was originally followed in
its formation. The source of the phraseology which has been always
employed for metaphysical discussion in modern times was the Latin
translations of Aristotle, in which, whether derived or not from
Arabic versions, the plan of the translator was not to seek for
analogous expressions in any part of Latin literature, but to
construct anew from Latin roots a set of phrases equal to the
expression of Greek philosophical ideas. Over such a process the
terminology of Roman law can have exercised little influence; at most,
a few Latin law terms in a transmuted shape have made their way into
metaphysical language. At the same time it is worthy of remark that
whenever the problems of metaphysics are those which have been most
strongly agitated in Western Europe, the thought, if not the language,
betrays a legal parentage. Few things in the history of speculation
are more impressive than the fact that no Greek-speaking people has
ever felt itself seriously perplexed by the great question of
Free-will and Necessity. I do not pretend to offer any summary
explanation of this, but it does not seem an irrelevant suggestion
that neither the Greeks, nor any society speaking and thinking in
their language, ever showed the smallest capacity for producing a
philosophy of law. Legal science is a Roman creation, and the problem
of Free-will arises when we contemplate a metaphysical conception
under a legal aspect. How came it to be a question whether invariable
sequence was identical with necessary connection? I can only say that
the tendency of Roman law, which became stronger as it advanced, was
to look upon legal consequences as united to legal causes by an
inexorable necessity, a tendency most markedly exemplified in the
definition of Obligation which I have repeatedly cited, "Juris
vinculum quo necessitate adstringimur alicujus solvendae rei."

But the problem of Free-will was theological before it became
philosophical, and, if its terms have been affected by jurisprudence,
it will be because Jurisprudence had made itself felt in Theology. The
great point of inquiry which is here suggested has never been
satisfactorily elucidated. What has to be determined, is whether
jurisprudence has ever served as the medium through which theological
principles have been viewed; whether, by supplying a peculiar
language, a peculiar mode of reasoning, and a peculiar solution of
many of the problems of