philosophy of the complex vision is an attempt to interpret
the mystery of the universe in terms of nothing else than actual
human experience. So we are not only permitted but compelled to
put out of court this conscience-less cave-man of pure speculation.
It is true that we encounter certain eccentric human beings who
deny that they possess this "moral sense"; but one has only to
observe them for a little while under the pressure of actual life to
find out how they deceive themselves.
Experience certainly indicates that every human being, however
normal and "good," has somewhere in him a touch of insanity and a
vein of anti-social aberration. But no human being, however
abnormal or however "criminal," is born into the world without this
invisible monitor we call "conscience."
The curious pathological experience which might be called
"conscience-killing" is certainly not uncommon. But it is an
experiment that has never been more than approximately successful.
In precisely the same way we might practise "reason-killing" or
"intuition-killing" or "taste-killing." One may set out to hunt and
try to kill any basic attribute of our complex vision; but the proof of
the truth of our whole argument lies in the fact that these murderous
campaigns are never completely successful. The "murdered"
attribute refuses to remain quiet in its grave. It stretches out an arm
from beneath the earth. It shakes the dust off and comes to life
again.
When we leave the question as to the existence of conscience, and
enquire what the precise and particular "command" of conscience
may be in any individual case, we approach the edge of an
altogether different problem.
The particular message or command of conscience is bound to differ
in a thousand ways in the cases of different personalities. Only in its
ultimate essence it cannot differ. Because, in its ultimate essence,
the conscience of every individual is confronted by that eternal
duality of love and malice which is the universal contradiction at the
basis of every living soul.
But short of this there is room for an infinite variety of "categorical
imperatives." The conscience of one personality is able to accept as
its "good" the very same thing that another personality is compelled
to regard as its "evil." Indeed it is conceivable that a moment might
arise in the history of the race when one single solitary individual
called that thing "good" or that thing "evil" which all the r
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