es and twilight-shores of our being,
which the austere categories of rational logic tend to shut out as if
by impenetrable walls.

It remains to consider the attribute of memory. Memory is the name
which we give to that intrinsic susceptibility, implying an intrinsic
permanence or endurance in the material which displays
susceptibility, such as makes it possible for what the soul feels or
what the soul creates to write down its own record, so that it can be
read at will, or if not "at will," at least can be read, if the proper
stimulus or shock be applied.

Memory is not the cause of the soul's concrete identity. The soul's
concrete identity is the cause or natural ground of memory. Memory
is the "passive-active" power by means of which the concrete
identity of the soul grows richer, fuller, more articulate, more
complex and more subtle.

In looking back over these eleven attributes of the "soul-monad,"
what we have to remark is, that two of the number differ radically in
their nature from the rest. The attribute of emotion differs from the
rest in the sense that it is the living substantial unity or ultimate
synthesis in which they all move. It is indeed more than this. For it
is the actual "stuff" or "material" out of which they are all, so to
speak, "made" or upon which they all, so to speak, inscribe their
diverse creations.

The permanent "surface," or identical susceptibility, of this ebbing
and flowing stream of emotion is memory; but the emotion itself,
divided into the positive and negative "pole," as we say of love and
malice, is an actual projection upon the objective universe of the
intrinsic "stuff" or psycho-material "substance" of which the
substratum of the soul is actually composed. The other aspects of
the soul are, so to speak, the various "tongues" of diversely coloured
flame with which the soul pierces the "objective mystery"; but the
substance of all these flames is one and the same. It is the soul
itself, projected upon the plane of material impression; and thus
projected, becoming the conflicting duality to which I give the name of
"emotion."

The attribute of "will," also, differs radically from the rest; in the
sense that "will" is the power which the soul possesses of
encouraging or suppressing, re-vivifying or letting fade, all the other
attributes of the soul, including that attribute which is the substance
and synthesis of them all and which I name "emotion."

In regard to "emotion