ek to Red Bank. Although they availed
themselves to a great extent of the transportation by water, yet their
line of march was so lengthened and encumbered by baggage, and the
weather was so intensely hot, that they were under the necessity of
proceeding slowly. Indeed their movements wore the appearance of
purposed delay; and were calculated to favour the opinion that Sir
Henry Clinton was willing to be overtaken, and wished for a general
engagement.

[Footnote 6: As the British army moved down Second street, Captain
M'Lane, with a few light horse and one hundred infantry, entered the
city, and cut off, and captured one Captain, one Provost Marshal, one
guide to the army, and thirty privates, without losing a man.]

As his line of march, until he passed Crosswicks, led directly up the
Delaware, General Washington found it necessary to make an extensive
circuit, and to cross the river at Coryell's Ferry; after which he
kept possession of the high grounds in Jersey, thereby retaining the
choice of bringing on, or avoiding an action.

[Sidenote: June 24.]

As Sir Henry Clinton encamped at, and about, Allentown, the main body
of the American army lay in Hopewell township, about five miles from
Princeton, Major General Dickenson, with about one thousand militia,
and Maxwell's brigade, hung on Sir Henry Clinton's left flank. General
Cadwallader, with Jackson's regiment and a few militia, was in his
rear; and Colonel Morgan with a regiment of six hundred men watched
his right.

[Sidenote: Council of war called by General Washington; decide
against attacking the enemy on the march.]

Notwithstanding the almost concurrent opinion of his general officers
against risking an action, Washington appears to have been strongly
inclined to that measure. He could not be persuaded that, with an army
rather superior in point of numbers to his enemy, too much was
hazarded by fighting him. The situation of the two armies was,
therefore, once more submitted to the consideration of the general
officers, who were asked whether it would be adviseable, of choice, to
hazard a general action? And, if it would, whether it should be
brought on by an immediate general attack, by a partial attack, or by
taking such a position as must compel the enemy to become the
assailants?

If the council should be of opinion that it was unadviseable to hazard
an engagement, then he asked what measures could be taken with safety
to the army, to annoy the