too
much, and receive too little.

On no subject whatever have considerations, such as these, possessed
more influence than in that which was now brought before the American
people. Their operation was not confined to those whose passions urged
them to take part in the war, nor to the open enemies of the
executive. The friends of peace, and of the administration, had
generally received impressions unfavourable to the fair exercise of
judgment in the case, which it required time and reflection to efface.
Even among them, strong prejudices had been imbibed in favour of
France, which the open attempts on the sovereignty of the United
States had only weakened; and the matters of controversy with Great
Britain had been contemplated with all that partiality which men
generally feel for their own interests. With respect to commerce also,
strong opinions had been preconceived. The desire to gain admission
into the British West India islands, especially, had excited great
hostility to that colonial system which had been adopted by every
country in Europe; and sufficient allowances were not made for the
prejudices by which that system was supported.

The treaty, therefore, when exposed to the public view, found one
party prepared for a bold and intrepid attack, but the other, not
ready in its defence. An appeal to the passions, the prejudices, and
the feelings of the nation, might confidently be made by those whose
only object was its condemnation; which reflection, information, and
consequently time, were required by men whose first impressions were
not in its favour, but who were not inclined to yield absolutely to
those impressions.

That a treaty involving a great variety of complicated national
interests, and adjusting differences of long standing, which had
excited strong reciprocal prejudices, would require a patient and
laborious investigation, both of the instrument itself, and of the
circumstances under which it was negotiated, before even those who are
most conversant in diplomatic transactions could form a just estimate
of its merits, would be conceded by all reflecting men. But an immense
party in America, not in the habit of considering national compacts,
without examining the circumstances under which that with Great
Britain had been formed, or weighing the reasons which induced it;
without understanding the instrument, and in many instances without
reading it, rushed impetuously to its condemnation; and, confi