men who left the
plough and the shop, the factory and the office, became trained
soldiers at the command of the staff as soon as they were in uniform
and had rifles. These men had the instinct of military co-ordination
bred in them, and so had their officers, while England had to take
men from the plough and the shop, the factory and the office, and
equip them and teach them the rudiments of soldiering before she
could consider making them into an army.

It was one thing for the spirit of British manhood to rise to the
emergency. Another and even more important requisite went with it. If
my country ever faces such a crisis I hope that we also may have the
courage of wisdom which leaves an expert's work to an expert.
England had Lord Kitchener, who could hold the imagination and the
confidence of the nation through the long months of preparation,
when there was little to show except repetition of drills here and there
on gloomy winter days. It required a man with a big conception and
patience and authority to carry it through, and recruits with an
unflinching sense of duty. The immensity of the task of transforming a
non-military people into a great fighting force grew on one in all its
humdrum and vital details as he watched the new army forming. "Are
you learning to think in big numbers?" was Lord Kitchener's question
to his generals.

Half of the regular officers were killed or wounded.

Where the leaders? Where the drillmasters for the new army? Old
officers came out of retirement, where they had become used to an
easy life as a rule, to twelve hours a day of hard application. "Dug-
outs" they were called. Veteran non-commissioned officers had to drill
new ones. It was demonstrated that a good infantry soldier can be
made in six months; perhaps in three. But it takes seven months to
build a rifle-plant; many more months to make guns--and the navy
must never be stinted. Probably the English are slow; slow and
thoroughgoing. They are good at the finish, but not quick at the start.
They are used to winning the last battle, which they say is the one
that counts. The complacency of empire with a century's power was a
handicap, no doubt. We are inclined to lean forward on our oars, they
to lean back--which does not mean that they cannot lean forward in
an emergency or that they lack reserve strength. It may lead us to
misjudge them.

Public impatience was inevitable. It could not be kept silent; that is the
English o