FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   399   400   401   402   403   404   405   406   407   408   409   410   411   412   413   414   415   416   417   418   419   420   421   422   423  
424   425   426   427   428   429   430   431   432   433   434   435   436   437   438   439   440   441   442   443   444   445   446   447   448   >>   >|  
teful appreciation and remembrance than was essentially their due. A phenomenon of a different sort, which is also to be placed at the threshold between Kant and Fichte, but which forms rather a supplement to the noetics and ethics of the latter than a link in the transition to them, has, on the contrary, gained an honorable position in the memory of the German people, viz., Schiller's aesthetics.[1] In its center stand the Kantian antithesis of sensibility and reason and the reconciliation of the two sides of human nature brought about by its occupation with the beautiful. Artistic activity or the play-impulse mediates between the lower, sensuous matter-impulse and the higher, rational form-impulse, and unites the, two in harmonious co-operation. Where appetite seeks after satisfaction, and where the strict idea of duty rules, there only half the man is occupied; neither lust nor moral worth is beautiful. In order that beauty and grace may arise, the matter-impulse and the form-impulse, or sensibility and reason, must manifest themselves uniformly and in harmony. Only when he "plays" is man wholly and entirely man; only through art is the development of humanity possible. The discernment of the fact that the beautiful brings into equilibrium the two fundamental impulses, one or the other of which preponderates in sensuous desire and in moral volition, does not of itself decide the relative rank of artistic and moral activity. The recognition of this mediating position of art may be connected with the view that it forms a transitional stage toward and a means of education for morality, as well as with the other, that in it human nature attains its completion. Evidence of both views can be found in Schiller's writings. At first he favors the Kantian moralism, which admits nothing higher than the good will, and sets art the task of educating men up to morality by ennobling their natural impulses. Gradually, however, aesthetic activity changes in his view from a preparation for morality into the ultimate goal of human endeavor. Peaceful reconciliation is of more worth than the spirit's hardly gained victory in the conflict with the sensibility; fine feeling is more than rational volition; the highest ideal is the beautiful soul, in which inclination not merely obeys the command of duty, but anticipates it. [Footnote 1: The most important of Schiller's aesthetic essays are those _On Grace and Dignity_, 1793; _On Naive and Se
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   399   400   401   402   403   404   405   406   407   408   409   410   411   412   413   414   415   416   417   418   419   420   421   422   423  
424   425   426   427   428   429   430   431   432   433   434   435   436   437   438   439   440   441   442   443   444   445   446   447   448   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

impulse

 

beautiful

 

activity

 

sensibility

 

Schiller

 

morality

 
gained
 

reason

 
position
 

Kantian


aesthetic

 
matter
 
volition
 
nature
 

impulses

 
sensuous
 

reconciliation

 
rational
 

higher

 

writings


completion
 

Evidence

 

relative

 

artistic

 

decide

 

preponderates

 

desire

 

recognition

 
education
 

mediating


connected

 

transitional

 

attains

 

ennobling

 

inclination

 

command

 

highest

 

victory

 
conflict
 
feeling

anticipates
 

Footnote

 
Dignity
 
important
 

essays

 
spirit
 

educating

 

moralism

 

admits

 
natural