g; _then_ we merely say, he is in earnest, he
feels what he says; still less when he expresses himself in imagery;
then, unless illustration be manifestly his sole object, we are apt to
say, this is affectation. It is when the feeling (instead of passing
away, or, if it continue, letting the train of thoughts run on
exactly as they would have done if there were no influence at work but
the mere intellect) becomes itself the originator of another train of
association, which expels or blends with the former; when (for
example) either his words, or the mode of their arrangement, are such
as we spontaneously use only when in a state of excitement, proving
that the mind is at least as much occupied by a passive state of its
own feelings, as by the desire of attaining the premeditated end which
the discourse has in view.[35]
[35] And this, we may remark by the way, seems to point to
the true theory of poetic diction; and to suggest the true
answer to as much as is erroneous of Wordsworth's celebrated
doctrine on that subject. For on the one hand, _all_ language
which is the natural expression of feeling, is really
poetical, and will be felt as such, apart from conventional
associations; but on the other, whenever intellectual culture
has afforded a choice between several modes of expressing the
same emotion, the stronger the feeling is, the more naturally
and certainly will it prefer the language which is most
peculiarly appropriated to itself, and kept sacred from the
contact of more vulgar objects of contemplation.
Our judgements of authors who lay actual claim to the title of poets,
follow the same principle. Whenever, after a writer's meaning is fully
understood, it is still matter of reasoning and discussion whether he
is a poet or not, he will be found to be wanting in the characteristic
peculiarity of association so often adverted to. When, on the
contrary, after reading or hearing one or two passages, we
instinctively and without hesitation cry out, 'This is a poet', the
probability is, that the passages are strongly marked with this
peculiar quality. And we may add that in such case, a critic who, not
having sufficient feeling to respond to the poetry, is also without
sufficient philosophy to understand it though he feel it not, will be
apt to pronounce, not 'this is prose', but 'this is exaggeration',
'this is mysticism', or, 'this is nonsense'.
Although a philo
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