constantly in mind if we wish to understand the currents and
under-currents of contemporary politics and make a correct forecast of
the future; if we wish to distinguish between what is real and unreal
in international relations, between the professions of politicians and
the aims and aspirations of the people. German statesmen may protest
about their love of peace, but the service they render to peace is
only lip service. Peace is only a means, war is the goal. We are
reminded of Professor Delbrueck's assertion that, considering the
infinitely complex conditions of modern warfare, many years of peace
are necessary to and must be utilized for the preparation of the wars
which are to come.
How, then, can we be reassured by any German pacifist protests and
demonstrations? How can we believe that German peace is anything more
than a precarious truce as long as German statesmen, German thinkers,
German teachers and preachers, unanimously tell us that the philosophy
of war is the only gospel of salvation? How can a patriotic German, if
he is consistent, abstain eventually from waging war when he is
firmly convinced that his country owes her political unity, her moral
temper, and her Imperial prosperity, whatever she is and whatever she
has, mainly to the agency of war? When war has done so much for
Germany in the past, will it not do greater things for Germany in the
future?
War may be a curse or it may be a blessing. If war is a curse, then
the wells of public opinion have been poisoned in Germany, perhaps for
generations to come. If war is a blessing, if the philosophy of war is
indeed the gospel of the super-man, sooner or later the German people
are bound to put that gospel into practice. They must look forward
with anxious and eager desire to the glorious day when once more they
are able to fight the heroic battles of Teutonism, when they are able
to fulfil the providential destinies of the German super-race, the
chosen champions of civilization."
IV.--WHY GERMANY HAS KEPT THE PEACE.
"Uninfluenced by those ominous signs of the times, English and German
optimists still refuse to surrender, still persist in their optimism.
They argue that the situation is no doubt serious, but that those
outbursts of popular feeling in Germany, violent as they are, have
largely been caused by English suspicion and distrust, and that there
has been nothing in the German policy to justify that English
suspicion and distrust. Afte
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