n which he presided, in spite of what might
have been supposed to be their predilections. When constitutional
questions trench, as they often do, on the domain of statesmanship, it
is natural, especially where precedents are lacking, that judges should
divide upon them in accordance with the views of government maintained
by the political parties with which they previously acted; and after
1811, a majority of Marshall's associates on the bench held their
appointment from administrations of the party opposed to that to which
he had belonged. This circumstance, however, does not appear to have
disturbed the consistent and harmonious development of the system to
which he was devoted; and it was in the second half of his term of
service that many of the most important cases--such as McCulloch _v_.
Maryland, Cohens _v_. Virginia, and Gibbons _v_. Ogden, in which he
asserted the powers of national government--were decided.

Nor is it alone upon his opinions on questions of constitutional law
that Marshall's fame as a judge rests. The decisions of the Supreme
Court on constitutional questions naturally attract greater popular
interest than its judgments in other matters; but we have seen that its
jurisdiction embraces a wide range of subjects. Nor is it desirable that
its sphere of action should be circumscribed in the direction of
confining it to questions that have a semi-political aspect. Indeed, it
may be believed that the safety and permanence of the court would be
best assured by extending rather than by contracting its jurisdiction in
ordinary comercial subjects. In dealing with such subjects, however,
Marshall did not achieve that pre-eminence which he acquired in the
domain of constitutional law, a fact doubtless to be accounted for by
the defects of his early legal education, since no originality of mind
can supply the place of learning in matters which depend upon reasoning
more or less technical and artificial. But in the domain of
international law, in which there was greater opportunity for elementary
reasoning, he exhibited the same traits of mind, the same breadth and
originality of thought, the same power in discovering, and the same
certainty in applying, fundamental principles that distinguished him in
the realm of constitutional discussions; and it was his lot on more than
one occasion to blaze the way in the establishment of rules of
international conduct. During the period of his judicial service,
decisio