, that creditors on either side should meet with no lawful
impediment to the recovery in full sterling money of _bona fide_ debts
contracted prior to the war. This stipulation is remarkable, not only as
the embodiment of an enlightened policy, but also as perhaps the
strongest assertion to be found in the acts of that time of the power
and authority of the national government. Indeed, when the British
creditors, after the establishment of peace, sought to proceed in the
State courts, they found the treaty unavailing, since those tribunals
held themselves still to be bound by the local statutes. In order to
remove this difficulty, as well as to provide a rule for the future,
there was inserted in the Constitution of the United States the clause
expressly declaring that treaties then made, or which should be made,
under the authority of the United States, should be the supreme law of
the land, binding on the judges in every State, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

On the strength of this provision, the question of the debts was raised
again, and was finally brought before the Supreme Court. Marshall
appeared for the State of Virginia, to oppose the collection of the
debt. He based his contention on two grounds: first, that by the law of
nations the confiscation of private debts was justifiable; second, that,
as the debt had by the law of Virginia been extinguished by its payment
into the State treasury, and had thus ceased to be due, the stipulation
of the treaty was inapplicable, since there could be no creditor without
a debtor. It is not strange that this argument was unsuccessful. While
it doubtless was the best that the cause admitted of, it may perhaps
serve a useful purpose as an illustration of the right of the suitor to
have his case, no matter how weak it may be, fully and fairly presented
for adjudication. On the question of the right of confiscation the
judges differed, one holding that such a right existed, while another
denied it, two doubted, and the fifth was silent. But as to the
operation of the treaty, all but one agreed that it restored to the
original creditor his right to sue, without regard to the original
validity or invalidity of the Virginia statute.

When Marshall took his seat upon the bench, the Supreme Court, since its
organization in 1790, had rendered only six decisions involving
constitutional questions. Of his three predecessors, Jay, Rutl