heir freights of assorted
humanity, and are immediately boarded by the dismounted men destined for
Komatipoort. The line is blocked with traffic, trains run anyhow, and it
will be some days before everything is ready for our trek to begin.
There being no longer any need for officials, my colleagues volunteered
to form themselves into a fighting corps, and did me the honour of
selecting me as their leader. The corps, however, lacked accoutrements.
I went down to Delagoa Bay. Upon returning, with two other officers, we
were arrested at the Portuguese station Moveni.
Although armed with passports signed by the District Governor, we were
informed that we would under no circumstances be allowed to recross the
frontier. Nor could we obtain permission to return to Lourengo Marques
by train. The young Portuguese commandant, a mirror of courtesy,
explained that we had either to await further orders there or walk back
to the Bay, a distance of fifty miles.
After waiting for several hours we quietly boarded a train coming from
Komatipoort, and managed to reach Lourengo Marques unobserved. We still
believed that we would contrive to get back somehow sooner or later, but
were soon cruelly undeceived. President Kruger, who was the guest of the
District Governor, wrote to General Coetser at Komatipoort, asking him
not to destroy the bridge and advising him to take refuge in Portuguese
territory. Coetser himself, with the few of his men who had fairly
decent horses, preferred to follow Botha, who by this time had begun his
trek from Hectorspruit, and left General Pienaar in charge of
Komatipoort.
Influenced by the arguments of the Portuguese--one of which was that,
should the British cross the Portuguese frontier and take the Boers in
the rear, Portugal would not be able to prevent it--and by the fact that
the positions first chosen for the entrenchments lay within a mile of
the frontier and therefore could not be occupied, a _Krygsraad_ resolved
to follow the President's advice. The bridge had already been mined, the
guns placed in position, and everything made ready to give Pole-Carew
and the Guards a worthy reception; but fate decided otherwise, and
General Pienaar, with some two thousand men, crossed the
frontier,--needless to say with what deep regret--thus reducing by
one-fifth our forces in the field, a loss which would have been avoided
had Steyn's advice been taken and guerilla warfare begun after
Machadodorp.
There
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