his
vessels began their work. In the meantime the armies were asking for
all sorts of transport and protective craft. So the first flotilla on
Mississippi waters started under the War (not the Navy) Department,
though manned under the executive orders of Commander John Rodgers,
U. S. N., who bought three river steamers at Cincinnati, lowered
their engines, strengthened their frames, protected their decks,
and changed them into gunboats.

The first phase of the clash in this land of navigable rivers had
ended, as we have seen already, with the taking of Boonville on
the Missouri by that staunch and daring Union regular, General
Nathaniel Lyon, on June 17, 1861. Boonville was a stunning blow
to secession in those parts. Confederate hopes, however, again
rose high when the news of Bull Run came through. At this time
General John C. Fremont was taking command of all the Union forces
in the "Western Department," which included Illinois and everything
between the Mississippi and the Rockies. Fremont's command, however,
was short and full of trouble. Round his headquarters at St. Louis
the Confederate colors were flaunted in his face. His requisitions
for arms and money were not met at Washington. Union regiments
marched in without proper equipment and with next to no supplies.
There were boards of inquiry on his contracts. There were endless
cross-purposes between him and Washington. And early in November he
was transferred to West Virginia just as he was about to attack with
what seemed to him every prospect of success. He had not succeeded.
But he had done good work in fortifying St. Louis; in ordering
gunboats, tugs, and mortar-boats; in producing some kind of system
out of utter confusion; in trusting good men like Lyon; and in
sending the then unknown Ulysses Grant to take command at Cairo,
the excellent strategic base where the Ohio joins the Mississippi.

The most determined fighting that took place during Fremont's command
was brought on by Lyon, who attacked Ben McCulloch at Wilson's Creek,
in southwest Missouri, on the tenth of August. Though McCulloch had
ten thousand, against not much over five, Lyon was so set on driving
the Confederates away from such an important lead-bearing region
that he risked an attack, hoping by surprise, skillful maneuvers,
and the help of his regulars to shake the enemy's hold, even if
he could not thoroughly defeat him. Disheartened by his repeated
failure to get reinforcements, an